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ABSTRACT
Soccer played a central role in Uruguay’s national identity throughout the 20th century.
The national team’s triumphs in the first half of the century were seen as proof that the
small nation could perform on a world stage. The mutually reinforcing relationship
between soccer success and national identity weakened after 1950 when the national team
stopped winning and when it entered into profound crisis in the 1990s as Uruguayan star
players began leaving the country to play in better leagues abroad. The national team no
longer provided the country with glory and the players were no longer mirrors of
Uruguayan society. Through his 2006 project, Óscar Washington Tabárez tackled both of
these problems. This thesis looks at how his institutional reforms and reinvention of the
Uruguayan national team's image allowed for the modernization of the team as well as
the emergence of a new relationship between national identity and soccer. This study
serves as an example of how a peripheral soccer country can adapt to the changes of
global commercialization, retain its national identity, and remain competitive.
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Introduction

In November 2009, I walked into my father’s study and caught him grinning. He
looked up at me and told me that Uruguay had qualified for the 2010 World Cup. Dad
and I had always bonded over my club and high school soccer games, but I had never
shared his passion for Uruguayan soccer. Seeing my lack of enthusiasm, he added that
qualifying was a big deal for Uruguay. I congratulated him and changed the topic. A
month later, as we ate Christmas Eve dinner in Barcelona with family friends, my father
pointed to the television as a highlight reel of a blonde player in a red and white striped
jersey came on and said, “that is Diego Forlán. He is Uruguayan and one of the best in
the Spanish league.” I looked up and saw that Forlán played for Atlético Madrid, a team I
had never heard mentioned in the United States, and looked away uninterested. I felt no
connection to this Uruguayan player; I was a fan of Barcelona, the only team whose
games I had ever seen on television in the United States. Barcelona was the only team
whose players I knew and felt inclined to support.
After watching Uruguay’s first World Cup game with my dad in early June, I
began to read articles on the players and watch interviews on YouTube. As the
tournament progressed, I started to skype my family in Uruguay after each match to hear
about the excitement on the streets of Montevideo. By the semifinals I was so invested
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that I spent my days reading comments on FIFA.com articles just to see what people
around the world were saying about the Uruguayan squad. Six months after shrugging off
Forlán, I cried while watching the live coverage of the Uruguayan national team’s return
to Montevideo, because I wanted to be there; I wanted to be with my cousins, aunts, and
uncles in the streets of Uruguay welcoming the very same players that months before I
had considered irrelevant to my life. I knew that I had undergone a deep change in the
previous month. I felt a connection and a comfort with Uruguay and my family there that
I had not felt since moving away in 2001. After years of suppressing my Uruguayan
identity, struggling to find topics of conversation with my family in Montevideo, and
refusing to read in Spanish or practice the language, I had begun to spend hours each day
listening to Uruguayan radio talk shows, reading the national newspapers, and calling my
family members at home. The team had built a bridge for me.
It was the intensity of the connection that I felt to the 2010 Uruguayan team, a
connection that developed in just weeks, that led me to spend these last four years
studying the role of soccer in Uruguayan society. The 2010 World Cup team had a lasting
impact on my life, leading me to join the Ole Miss Honors College’s World Cup Initiative
and choose a thesis topic about Uruguayan soccer. The experience had strongly
influenced my identity, but I wondered whether the ‘new’ national team had strengthened
other Uruguayans’ sense of national identity, as well. My revitalized connection with
Uruguay stemmed from the interviews, social media posts, and behavior of the national
team; how had these mediums allowed me to develop such a strong connection to the
group even while living in Mississippi? Why was this group different from previous
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teams? These are the questions I have researched for the past four years and the ones that
led me to focus on the relationship between the Uruguayan national team and fans for my
thesis.
Soccer has always been a point of pride for South American countries. It has been
one arena where they have been able compete on equal footing with Europeans. Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay won half the World Cups held in the twentieth century; those
victories enriched the national narratives of these countries. By the 1990s, however, the
commercialization of club soccer in western Europe led to changes in global soccer that
detrimentally affected all South American clubs and, eventually, national teams. Through
partnerships with corporations, television rights, and merchandise sales, European clubs
transformed soccer into a profit-driven industry. These advancements caused a
divergence between the quality of South American and European clubs, resulting in the
transfer of South America’s top players to the European leagues.
In 1995, the Bosman ruling exacerbated the disparity between the two continents.
The ruling caused a massive increase in the salaries offered by top European clubs, while
also loosening the restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed on all European
club rosters. This facilitated an international labor market for professional soccer players
of all levels. Promising players began to leave the southern continent at younger and
younger ages, meaning they lived most of their lives abroad and rarely played with their
compatriots; this challenged the cohesiveness of South American national teams. The
high transfer rates also caused South American clubs’ quality of play to decline; teams
began to be comprised of promising, young players waiting to be scouted, individuals
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that were not good enough to play abroad, and older players that returned after their
careers abroad had ended.
In this study, I focus on how global commercialization of soccer affected
Uruguay, a small country of 3.5 million people whose success on the soccer field had
been an important part of its national identity. With few battles and historical figures to
commemorate, Uruguay derived many of its most revered heroes and epics from the
soccer fields. Due to the global commercialization of soccer, Nacional and Peñarol, the
country’s largest clubs, became export factories in the 1990s. As players left the country
at younger ages, became more affluent as European club salaries increased, and
transformed into celebrities due to an increasing commercialization of the athletes’
image, Uruguayans no longer identified with their national team players as they once had.
The players were not simple or humble; they were not mirrors of the Uruguayan society.
Uruguayans asked themselves: were these players actually representatives of the small,
South American country, or of their flashy affluent clubs abroad?
Uruguayans’ questioning of the national team players’, and thus the team’s,
Uruguayaness challenged the connection between soccer and national identity in
Uruguay. How could a group of soccer players living outside the country and playing by
the rules of the global market be the symbol of a soccer nation with a glorious past? If we
think of national identity as “a shared sense of nation-hood grounded in the images and
stories associated with an identifiable nation-state”, then the Uruguayan national teams of
the past had helped create that shared sense of nationhood for Uruguay.1 Their triumphs

1

Jay Coakley and Mojca Doupona Topič, “Sport and National Identity: The Case of Latin America”, ALESDE, 2010: 2.
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were the images and stories that contributed to the country’s shared story. Uruguayans
“learn(t) these images and stories and use(d) them to (a) express their connection with the
larger collectivity, and (b) identify others as members of that collectivity or as
outsiders”.2 the national team, whose predecessors had helped create that imagined
collective, was no longer identified as a member of that collective, but rather as a group
comprised of outsiders. Place had always been central to national identity, so as national
team players began to spend the majority of their careers abroad, the relationship between
the national team and Uruguayan national identity flagged.
After being hired as the Uruguayan national team coach in 2006, Óscar Washington
Tabárez implemented a long-term project to reinvigorate the national team, which
accepted the realities of the world of globalized soccer, included a strong focus on the
team’s public image, and tried to find a novel way for the national team to contribute
images and stories to the Uruguayan national narrative. Tabárez knew that the players’
transfers at young ages and high quality lives abroad were unavoidable in a world of
globalized soccer. Thus, his reforms aimed to improve the on the field results of the
Uruguayan national squad, known as La Celeste, but they also attempted to redefine the
relationship between the national team and Uruguayans in the new transnational context.
He sought to show that although the players lived abroad with high quality lifestyles, they
were still a symbol of Uruguay and that thus, the national team still contributed to the
country’s shared sense of nation-hood. Through his reforms, he hoped to show that even

2

Ibid.
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in the new transnational context, the national team could still be a pillar of the Uruguayan
national identity.

Chapter Structure
The opening chapter of this thesis introduces the global commercialization of
soccer and their effects on South American soccer, in general. The chapter summarizes
the changes that English soccer underwent in the early 1990s, which transformed it into
an industry focused not only on winning, but the maximization of profit. I then go on to
discuss how the commercialization of the sport and the Bosman ruling led to similar
changes all around Europe, causing the salaries and quality of infrastructure of the top,
elite European club teams to improve dramatically and European club players to become
affluent international celebrities. The second half of the chapter concentrates on how the
global interconnectedness created by global player markets and television placed South
American countries in direct competition with these affluent European clubs for players
and fans. The chapter ends with a discussion on the impact of the disparity between
European and South American clubs.
Seminal texts such as Sociology of Football by Richard Giulianotti and
“Recovering the Social: Globalization, Football, and Transnationalism” by Giulianotti
and Roland Robertson provide the historical and sociological foundation for the study. I
then use articles, such as “The Neoliberalization of Football: Rethinking Neoliberalism
Through the Commercialization of the Beautiful Game” by Sam Dubal and “Soccer in
the Age of Globalization” by Osvaldo Croci and Julian Ammirante to discuss the
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commercialization of the sport, the implementation of free market principles, and the
changes in the transfer market. I utilize these texts to connect the major issues of
commercialization, globalization, transnationalism, and national identity with respect to
soccer. Specifically, I discuss how the spread of goods and people brought about by
globalization led to the development of a transnational culture and challenged national
identity. Finally, I utilize several case studies on specific countries, such as Argentina and
Chile to show how these changes affected South American countries.
The second chapter focuses on how the global commercialization of the sport
affected Uruguay, specifically. First, I summarize the role that Uruguayan soccer and the
national team held in constructing the foundation of the Uruguayan national identity in
the early twentieth century. After covering the importance of soccer in the national
identity, I explain the effects of the global commercialization on Uruguayan soccer in the
1990s, such as the decline of Uruguayan clubs, like Peñarol and Nacional, the exodus of
players abroad, and the resulting strained relationship between the national team players
abroad and the Uruguayan public. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how
players’ life of luxury and perceived lack of effort for the national team led to the
questioning of their dedication and passion to Uruguay as a nation.
For Chapter Two, I utilize scholarly and journalistic articles that concentrate on
the early decades of Uruguayan soccer and its role in the development of its national
identity. For the 1990s, the information largely stems from books such as Yo Paco: un
antes y después del fútbol uruguayo by Mario Bardanca and La Crónica Celeste by Luis
Prats. To demonstrate how the players abroad were portrayed and perceived during that
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time period I draw from the following sources: the Gallup Poll conducted after the 1990
World Cup, Luis Cubilla’s famous 1991 interview, Uruguayan television clips from Juego
Limpio after the 1994 Qualifiers, and international press articles. Unfortunately, the main
Uruguayan newspapers, El Observador and El Pais, do not maintain an online archive for
years before 2000, and there are no accessible holdings of these two papers in US
libraries. For the years after 2000, in contrast, I was able to use their online archives,
although they are cumbersome to use for lack of search functions. I looked through each
day’s sport’s section for the years 2001-2011 and consulted all of the articles that were
about the national team.
The third chapter dissects the institutional changes implemented after 2006 by
coach Tabárez to overcome the negative effects that global commercialization had on the
national team and to redefine the relationship between the team and Uruguayans. His
reforms were aimed at improving the team’s performance, but also creating greater
identification with the national team. First, I delineate the difficult conditions faced by
Uruguayan star players when they played for the national squad: the lack of friendlies and
poor infrastructure. Then, I discuss Tabárez’s long-term proposal from 2006 that aimed to
restructure the youth divisions, overhaul the national team image, and provide continuity
through the establishment of team policies. After describing his plan in detail, I finish the
chapter by highlighting the on-the-field results that his project produced.
The main sources for Chapter Three are official documents authored by Tabárez,
such as his 2005 speech at the Uruguayan Soccer Museum, “The Formation of the Soccer
Player,” and the 2006 project proposal entitled “The Institutionalization of the Processes
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of the National Teams and the Formation of their Players”. I utilize articles from El
Observador and El País as a source for details on Tabárez’s project and its results. I also
draw from an array of interviews with Uruguayan players and public figures about the
Tabárez Process that is found in El Camino es la Recompensa: Conversations with Óscar
Washington Tabárez.
The fourth chapter looks at how Tabárez’s push for a new player profile
strengthened Uruguayans’ identification with the players. I begin the chapter with a
description of the changes that occurred on the national team during the Tabárez years;
the squad became more professional and presented itself as more humble, attentive to
fans, and actively involved with society. The new style improved the intra-team
chemistry and camaraderie, as well as the public perception of the players. The second
part of the chapter analyzes how the Uruguayan Football Association employed media to
improve the national team’s image. Television ad campaigns allowed players to endorse
Uruguayan products, while also highlighting their own positive values and patriotism.
Social media and television provided channels for players to showcase their patriotism
and the Uruguayan aspects of their everyday lives abroad. I conclude the chapter with a
discussion on how Tabárez’s off-the-field changes improved fans’ relationship with the
Uruguayan team.
I depend on post-2010 newspaper articles published in El Pais and El Observador,
Fútbol y Otros Deportes by Ricardo Piñeyrua, and video clips from Pasión Mundial,
Camara Celeste, and Por la Camiseta to trace the changes that occurred after 2006. El
Camino es la Recompensa: Conversations with Óscar Washington Tabárez is again a
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main source. I also used quotes from the television sports show, La Hora del Deporte,
from before and after the 2010 World Cup to show the complete reversal of the media
portrayal of Tabárez and the players from a critical, questioning one to praiseful and
lauding. Finally, I utilize advertisements from several Uruguay companies to show the
players’ involvement in marketing campaigns.
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Chapter One: The Global Commercialization of Soccer and National Identity

On March 22, 2015, Lionel Messi, Neymar Santos, and Luis Suárez led the Nike
and Qatar Airways sponsored FC Barcelona to a 2-1 victory over the Adidas and Fly
Emirates backed Real Madrid in front of a crowd of over 98,000 people and an estimated
television audience of hundreds of millions.1 For the match, Lionel Messi and Luis
Suárez sported Adidas cleats, while Neymar wore Nike ones due to their personal
endorsement deals that complement their combined 78.6 million dollar annual salaries
with an additional 43.5 million dollars.2 The sky-high incomes of top players, the
dominance of foreign players on most club rosters, the modern stadiums with ever-higher
ticket prices, the reliance on television revenue, and the central role of sponsorship deals
are all part of soccer today, but these are recent developments. Professional clubs have
always been businesses, but it was not until the 1990s that they understood themselves as
global companies focused on marketing and establishing a brand.

Commercialization: Merchandise, Sponsors, Television, and the Bosman Ruling
The globalization of soccer permitted for the rapid evolution of the sport.
Globalization refers to the intensification of global economic, financial, and cultural

1

Pete Jenson, “Barcelona 2-1 Real Madrid: Luis Suárez scores El Clasico winner…,” Daily Mail UK, March 22, 2015.
Christina Settimi, “Cristiano Ronaldo Edges Lionel Messi As The World's Highest-Paid Soccer Player,” Forbes, May
16, 2015.
2
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flows that create an increased interdependence between countries.3 According to
Robertson, globalization in the last five decades has been driven by rapid advancements
in technology and digital communication, the mitigation of trade and financial barriers,
and the emergence of an international labor market.4 The loosened borders and the virtual
proximity provided by technology has permitted an increase in the movement of goods,
capital, and people which, in turn, has connected the world to the point that a global
culture has emerged. Globalization of soccer in the 1990s was accompanied by the
commercialization of the sport, the infiltration and promotion of market-driven ideology
and profit-maximizing business models into the sporting realm.5 This study will refer to
the processes of globalization and commercialization as global commercialization.
The commercialization of soccer began in England, but had global effects. During
the Thatcher years,6 English soccer clubs began to concentrate on profit maximization,
transforming soccer into a commodity, a cultural product that could be bought and sold to
consumers. In the 1980s, the English game had been infamous for its problems with
violence and infrastructure. In order to tackle these issues, in the early 1990s, all of the
standing space in stadiums was eliminated and replaced with seating areas.7 The
renovations improved security at the stadium as expected, but also decreased the supply
of tickets available, increased the comfort and splendor of the stadiums, and raised ticket
prices. The stadium renovations helped quell the hooligan problem by converting soccer
3

Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (SAGE Publications,1992), 8.
Richard Giulianotti and Roland Robertson, “History: The Global Sport and the Making of Globalization” in
Globalization & Football (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2009), 5.
5 Sam Dubal, “The neoliberalization of football: Rethinking neoliberalism through the commercialization of the
beautiful game,” International Review for the Sociology of the Sport, 126.
6 Croci Osvaldo and Julian Ammirante, “Soccer in the Age of Globalization”, Peace Review (1999): 499.
7 Dubal, 126.
4
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into a luxury good. Croci and Ammirante explain that the renovations “… led clubs to
begin to look at supporters as consumers to whom one could sell more than simply a
match.”8 The stadium refurbishments and the increase in ticket prices occurred at the
same time as the creation of the English Premier League which began its trajectory in
1992 with a lucrative deal with BSkyB for 304 million pounds over five years for
television rights.9 The English league “characterized by deliberate moves by top clubs to
exploit their position as global brands, to maximize profit… and to attract corporate
hospitality and the professional classes” became the new business model for professional
soccer.10
The financial success of the new model promulgated similar shifts in the rest of
Europe; however, South American countries were unable to follow suit. The 1990s were a
positive economic time for Europe; the opening up of the East led to new trade partners
and economic opportunities, so countries were able to invest time and resources in more
lavish areas, such as the soccer industry. South America, on the other hand, was only
transitioning to neoliberal policies at the time; the continent was too preoccupied with
recovering from the “Lost Decade” of the 1980s to dedicate funds and attention to their
declining soccer teams. South America did not have the resources to match European
soccer developments and thus, a widening disparity between the sport in Europe and
South America emerged.

8

Croci and Ammirante, 499.
Jason Rodrigues, “Premier League football at 20: 1992, the start of a whole new ball game,” The Guardian, February
2, 2012.
10 Rex Nash, “The Sociology of English Football in the 1990s: Fandom, Business, and Future Research”, Football
Research Unit (2000): 50.
9
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These changes marked the emergence of soccer clubs as businesses competing in
two arenas: game results and finances. Club finances increasingly influenced game
results, because clubs with higher funding were better able to improve infrastructure and
rosters. As the 1990s progressed, game days became even less central to the club as
ticket sale earnings began to comprise smaller portions of clubs’ revenue due to the
growing importance of television rights and merchandise sales.11 Clubs began to sell
diverse products with the emblem and colors of the team, such as jerseys, scarves, flags,
and hats to their fans in Europe, developing a brand and turning the club itself into a
commodity to be consumed.12 The clubs’ brands have continued to grow in value in the
twenty-first century as their reach has expanded with increased television coverage and
the opening of retail stores worldwide. A prime example of the growth is Manchester
United, which in the middle of the nineties was bringing in twice as much with
merchandise sales and logo licensing than with game day sales and that by early 2015
had a brand value of $446 million.13
While clubs depended on the sponsors for revenue, sponsors relied on the popular
clubs for the creation of an emotional and cultural identification between the public and
their products.14 The intensification of the relationship between corporations and soccer
occurred when companies began to sponsor jerseys.15 Currently, more than 687 million
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Wes Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?,” Business of Soccer, 2014.
Croci and Ammirante, 499.
13 Croci and Ammirante, 499.; Mike Ozanian, “The Forbes Fab 40: The World’s Most Valuable Sports Brands 2015,”
Forbes, October 22, 2015.
14 Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?”.
15 Ric W. Jensen, Nicolas D. Bowman, Brian V. Larson, and Yawei Wang, “Looking at Shirt Sponsorships From Both
Sides of the Pond: Comparing Global Trends Versus America’s Major League Soccer”, Soccer & Society (2013): 2.
12
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euros of the top European leagues’ revenue comes from jersey sponsorships,16 with the
largest deal being Adidas’ 10 year $1.28 billion partnership with Manchester United.17
While jersey sponsors may have sparked the relationship between corporations and
soccer clubs, sponsorships can be found in other forms as well, such as Barclay’s 50
million euro deal for the league naming rights for the English Premier League and
BBVA’s 20 million euro naming deal with La Liga, the Spanish club league.18 As clubs
became associated with specific brands, like Manchester United and Chevrolet or Chelsea
and Samsung, players followed a similar path, endorsing products and representing
corporations to the point of becoming the recognizable face of the companies. As clubs
and players became more successful, both on the field and financially, sponsorships
increased and the clubs became wealthier, making their brand value grow even further.
Cornel Sandvoss argues in A Game of Two Halves that the most important
contributor to the globalization of soccer during the last few decades was television,
because it “fundamentally altered notions of ‘here’ and ‘there’.”19 Color, satellite, and
high definition television allowed for quality international coverage of European
matches, permitting soccer fans around the world to follow European club teams.
International fans’ novel interest in the European league allowed clubs to target the global
consumer market and sell their jerseys and apparel worldwide. Clubs’ widened global
reach and increased popularity made them “golden marketing vehicle(s) for regional

16

“Premier League clubs see 36% rise in shirt sponsorship income,” ESPN, February 24, 2015.
Kurt Badenhausen, “Manchester United Kit Launch Generates Millions in Social Media Value For Adidas,” Forbes,
August 5, 2015.
18 “European Soccer Leagues’ Revenue From League Naming Rights,” The Statista Portal.
19 Cornel Sandvoss, A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television, and Globalization (Routledge, 2003), 2.
17
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brands across the globe.”20 Television contracts increased the appeal of clubs to
sponsors, commercial revenue due to international fandoms, and the brand value of the
clubs overall, while also being their second largest source of revenue, an estimated $2.7
billion dollars annually for Europe’s largest leagues.21
Merchandise, sponsorships, and television contracts increased the wealth and
power of European clubs, but it was not until the mid-1990s that players’ salaries began
to reflect that new reality. In 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled in favor of JeanMarc Bosman in a court case against the Belgian league. Bosman’s contract had ended at
RFC Liège in Belgium and although he wanted to leave for Dunkerque in France, he was
unable to do so since his club refused to accept the transfer fee that the French team was
offering.22 It was as if Bosman’s expired contract had held a non-compete clause for the
entire soccer industry; unless the Belgian team agreed to a fee, Bosman could not join
another team. The Bosman ruling stated that clubs could no longer charge transfer fees
for players whose contracts had expired,23 since any laborer who became unemployed
had the right to find a new employer.
The Bosman ruling improved the salary and rights of top players at the expense of
clubs, especially smaller clubs. Before 1995, top clubs had seen their revenues shoot up
in comparison to their costs; after the Bosman ruling, they had to spend some of that new
income to retain or acquire their best players. Since players could refuse to renew their

20

Harris, “How Do Soccer Clubs Make Money?”.
“Revenue from broadcasting rights of the Big Five European soccer leagues in 2013…,” The Statista Portal.
22 Robert Simmons, “Implications of the Bosman Ruling for Football Transfer Markets”, Economic Affairs (1997): 13.
23 Stefan Késenne, “Youth Development and Training after the Bosman Verdict (1995) and the Bernard Case (2010) of
the European Court of Justice”, European Sport Management Quarterly (2011): 548.
21
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contract and leave clubs for free, clubs were forced to offer lucrative wages and perks in
order to retain players at the end of each contract.24 If the renewal contracts were not
attractive enough, clubs had to accept a transfer fee from another club before the players’
contracts expired or risk losing the players without even receiving a fee. If a club was
wealthy, then it could utilize its income from merchandise and sponsorships to offer the
players an irresistible offer and force the other clubs to present very large offers to buyout
players’ contracts. Smaller clubs were unable to offer these lucrative contracts and thus
were forced to accept any decent offers or risk losing their players for free at the end of
their contracts. They became a type of farm teams — they developed young, promising
players and then sold them to the more elite clubs for relatively low transfer fees. Along
with increasing their power and salaries, the Bosman ruling changed the players’
relationship to clubs. Prior to the court ruling, players often remained at one club for their
entire career, but after it, players moved around as the transfer market mandated. This
challenged the sense of loyalty that had previously existed between players, their clubs,
and their fans.25
The commercialization of soccer in Europe had a sizable impact on South
American soccer since the increased global flows of people and information allowed
players and fans to abandon local teams for the better situated European clubs. When the
Bosman Case caused an increase in both wages and transfer fees for elite players in
Europe, the elite European clubs were able to use their large revenues to adjust. South

24

Simmons, 15-18.; Tom Fordyce, “10 years since Bosman,” BBC Sport, December 14, 2005.
Giménez Rodríguez, La pasión laica: una breve historia del fútbol uruguayo (Rumbo Editorial, 2007),
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American clubs, similarly to the small European clubs, did not earn as much revenue
from merchandise, sponsorships, or television rights and thus, were unable to adjust to
the Bosman ruling’s ramifications. South American clubs could not offer players the
wages or working conditions that Europe’s best teams could, so they too became farm
teams. Rather than benefitting from merchandise sales and television rights, South
American clubs became dependent on the sale of players. This became an exodus,
expanding from the transfer of top players straight to elite European clubs to the more
systematic transfer of young talent to smaller clubs abroad that later sell the players to
elite clubs if the players continue to thrive. In 2010, Argentina alone exported almost
1,000 players to all divisions of the top European leagues and more than 1,200 to other
leagues around the world.26 This creates a vicious cycle in which the transfer of players
abroad lowers the quality of league play in South America, which deters fans from
attending local matches and in turn hurts clubs and forces them to keep selling players.
The spectacle of European soccer does not only attract South American players,
but also South American fans. Satellite television, high definition coverage, and livestreaming websites allow South Americans to watch the coverage of the European
leagues along with the lower quality, national coverage of local clubs that are technically
lacking.27 Pablo Alabarces explains that for Argentinians, television coverage confirms
“that their domestic game is excluded from these new global arenas.”28 Luis Prats writes
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that in Uruguay, “international soccer steals the domestic audience…kids ask their
parents for a Barcelona or Bayern Munich jersey, and know way more about Zlatan
Ibrahimovic and Cristiano Ronaldo than they do about Wanderers or River Plate’s
forwards.”29 Fans are no longer limited to following and identifying with lackluster local
clubs; they can watch star-studded teams like Barcelona and Real Madrid play in multimillion dollar stadiums in high definition every week.30

National Identity in the Globalized Soccer World
In the early 20th century, South American soccer players were perceived as local
heroes that represented the country. A player’s respected qualities were aspects of his
character that were thought to represent the nation: leadership, glory, respect, decency,
and perseverance.31 The commercialization in the 1990s changed the player from the
“traditional, local, and in most cases proletarian hero, to the modern global star product
of Western cultural imperialism and neo-liberalism.”32 Successful players became
wealthy celebrities and hence, instead of human qualities and national attributes, what
came to define them were their affluence and image. Their celebrity status was exploited
by corporations that utilized them as public faces; this disassociated the players, their
success, and their achievements from the country and reattached it to companies’
commercial brand.33 Players’ new celebrity status and wealth caused fans to feel
29
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abandoned. In The Neoliberalization of Football, Sam Dubal shares a quote from a fan
that is contrasting the contemporary players to those of the past by saying “you saw them
getting on a bus. The same bus as the fans… you wouldn’t get that now. Just, ‘go away
little boy’, it would be that kind of attitude. And that’s how it has moved away from the
fans.”34
Along with the general distancing between fans and athletes as the latter became
affluent, distant celebrities, the mass transfer of players to Europe jeopardized the
relationship between many South American players and national fans. South Americans
from countries with rich soccer histories struggled to identify with players that lived most
of their lives abroad with wealthy lifestyles and that only played at home during a few
national team matches each year.35 As players left to have more lucrative careers in
Europe, “under-performing athletes (were) often judged from a moral aspect in the public
discourse.”36 Fans who felt abandoned by their national players questioned the players’
passion and dedication for the country and accused them of being sell-outs and wealth
seekers who gave “allegiance to clubs rather than nation.”37 Instead of seeing their
players as transmigrants, migrants who “develop and maintain multiple relations….that
span borders”,38 fans saw their players as migrants who chose to leave South America
behind. The players’ adoption of European tactics and luxurious lifestyles was seen as a
betrayal of their national identities.
34
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Joshua Nadel, a Latin America and Caribbean historian, expands on this idea with
the example of Lionel Messi, an Argentine who has won FIFA player of the year five
times and is recognized as the best player of the world: “Critics accused him of seeming
lost on the field with the national team… so used to playing with the world’s best on
Barça, these critics said, he was unable to adapt… at home Messi was faulted for not
‘feeling the Argentine jersey…In short, Messi did not play the way he was expected to.
He did not play la nuestra, the Argentine style.”39 Nadel goes on to add that even though
Messi turned down Spanish citizenship in 2004 in order to be able to play for Argentina,
he is still often labeled as a foreigner. This issue is not unique to Messi. The accusation is
made against most of Argentina’s national team members that play abroad; they are
accused of having “lost Argentina’s supposedly innate style of play.”40 The criticism is
rooted in the fact that Argentinians are expected to play a la nuestra, just like Brazilians
and Uruguayans are expected to play with the styles of futebol arte and garra charrúa,
respectively. Nadel concludes that the national style is “embedded in the way that Latin
Americans think about both their soccer and themselves.”41
Lloyd Wong and Ricardo Trumper, Canadian sociologists, present a contrasting
case to Nadel’s Argentina one. Iván Zamorano was a Chilean soccer player that played
abroad for more than half of his soccer career in top clubs in Switzerland, Spain, and
Italy. Unlike Argentinian players who are often accused of being “foreigners”, Zamorano
was seen as a successful transmigrant representing Chile abroad. Fans did not think of
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Chilean players’ transfers abroad as them abandoning the nation, but rather as them
following the forces of the global economy. Chile did not have a history of soccer
accomplishments, so the transfer of players to the the elite European leagues was seen
“not so much as the deterritorialization and transnationalism of players, but rather as a
marker of the increasing improvement of Chilean commodities abroad.”42 Even though
he was wealthy, lived in Europe, and had multiple nationalities, Zamorano was a “core
element in the making and remaking of the edifices of Chilean identity.”43 This was
thanks to his “ineffable Chilean demeanor and personality that (had) not been corrupted
or refined by the profits.”44 Since the media played many of his games from Europe,
Zamorano “… was still playing in Chilean living rooms…He played at the same time for
Internazionale and, by being a Chilean, for Chile.”45 Zamorano and other Chilean soccer
players in Europe were points of pride for Chile; they were proof that Chileans could
compete in the outside world.
Argentina and Chile present two opposing ways that South American countries
have perceived the exodus of their players and the emergence of transnationalism, an
interconnection of people and groups across borders, that has accompanied recent
globalization. 46 National identity is based on shared imagery and stories, so when soccer
players, members of society that had once been protagonists of the shared national
stories, are far away and living a different lifestyle, their relationship with the imagined
42
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community is threatened. For that reason, Argentina, a country that once had a strong
internationally renowned league and had consistently fought for the World Cup title, sees
players’ emigration and the rise of a transnational culture as “the collapse of the
mythological coupling of soccer and nation.”47 The players are seen as foreigners,
immigrants who have chosen another style and way of life over the Argentinian ones. On
the other hand, the Chilean players’ experiences abroad are taken as Chilean stories and
images; they are part of the national narrative and contribute to the country’s national
identity. The Chileans, who did not have a strong soccer history, see their players as more
of transmigrants; they live and adopt European qualities, but are still seen as Chilean.
Zamorano and other athletes “embody transnational cultural and capitalist business
practices, and at the same time, willingly serve as national cultural icons for the
formation and reaffirmation of national identities.”48 Chileans do not see the players’
transfers as them giving up their Chilean characteristics, but as them going out into the
world to represent Chile.
The cases of Argentina and Chile are examples of opposing interpretations by
scholars of the global commercialization’s effects on national identity and soccer. As
globalization has progressed, scholars disagree over whether national identity and soccer
culture have become damaged, reimagined, or strengthened by globalizing trends. Some
scholars argue that the shift of importance from national to international has led to the
dulling of the “radiance of the nation”, the breaking down of identities, and the
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weakening of national unity.49 These scholars can point to cases like Argentina’s where
global commercialization has threatened the relationship between soccer and national
identity;50 the players that were once symbols of the nation are now perceived as
“foreigners”. Others insist that external pressures have been met with measures seeking
to reaffirm the peculiarities and uniqueness of the nations. These scholars, on the other
hand, look to countries like Chile that have utilized their citizens’ success as a source of
national pride. Jean Harvey states that “the global does not mean the disappearance of the
local… globalization has been accompanied by an explosion of nationalism.”51 Countries
have reacted to the transnational and global homogenization by emphasizing the local and
national, fortifying old identities or cultivating new ones in relation to the new global
setting.52 Some countries, and governments, in particular, have sought to affirm current
national identities through soccer nationalism or worked to construct new distinct
identities through soccer in the new global context.53
The last decade of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a new business
model for professional soccer, a profit-maximizing model that relies heavily on
merchandise sales and sponsorships. The commercialization of the sport began in
England, but the interconnectivity provided by television and the international labor
market spurred by the Bosman ruling caused it to spread throughout Europe. European
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soccer became a spectacle: multi-million dollar brand values, stadiums, and salaries; it
drew fans and players from around the world. Due to the size of their local market and
their inability to develop an international following, South American clubs were not able
to keep up with the changes in Europe and thus lost players and fans to Europe. This
weakened the identification between the fans and the players in countries with rich soccer
histories and challenged the role of soccer in South American national identities.

25

Chapter Two: From Local Heroes to Repatriados

Throughout the last century, soccer has held a central place in Uruguayan society.
In the first half of the twentieth century, soccer victories gave Uruguayans a rallying
point and a common culture; they contributed many of the stories and images on which
Uruguay’s shared sense of nationhood was founded. The celebrated national team players
were everyday Uruguayans, struggling proletariat, that prevailed against larger and richer
countries with dedication, passion, and garra charrúa, the characteristically Uruguayan
drive to overcome unlikely odds and improbable situations. The glory fostered a close
relationship between national players and soccer fans, who saw the players as worthy
representatives of the country’s characteristics. Soccer became an important element of
the Uruguayan identity; it provided the country with heroes and epics that “fill the
vacuum of a country that feels itself an orphan of History.”1 When the national team no
longer had the same success in the second half of the century, initially soccer continued to
be a prevalent identity marker for Uruguayans due to national clubs’ success in
international competitions. By the 1990s, however, with the national team and the
national clubs nowhere near their old glory, the relationship between the distant, wealthy
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superstars and Uruguayan fans began to deteriorate, challenging the historic role of the
national team in the Uruguayan national identity.

Uruguay’s Early Glory Days
Soccer’s importance in Uruguay is due to the national team’s success during the
first half of the twentieth century. In 1924, the Uruguayan soccer team won the country’s
first Gold Medal in the Olympic Games.2 Four years later, Uruguay returned to the top
spot of the podium, confirming that the best soccer in the world was being played in
South America. The national team’s success in the 1920s led to the country’s hosting of
the first FIFA World Cup in 1930, which it also won.3 Uruguay returned to the World Cup
stage in 1950, making it to the final game of the round robin tournament and defeating
the host nation, Brazil, 2-1.4 The victory continued Uruguay’s undefeated streak in
international competition and marked the culmination of its glory days.
Government support contributed to the quick improvement and success of
Uruguayan soccer in the early twentieth century. In Soccer in Sun and Shadow, Eduardo
Galeano explains that “Uruguay’s success at the ’24 and ’28 Olympics, and its
subsequent World Cup victories in 1930 and 1950, owed a large debt to the government’s
policy of building sports fields around the country to promote physical education.”5 In
1913, there were only two fields in Montevideo. Fifteen years and two Olympic Gold
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medals later, there were 118.6 Additionally, it was the government established newspaper,
El Dia, that “transformed the triumphs of the amateur team at the Olympic games in
Colombes (Paris) into a national gesture.”7 On the day of the 1924 victory, the
newspaper described the players as symbols of the nation with language that could be
found in a national anthem:
“You are Uruguay. You are now the homeland, boys ... They all stand, move forward
gallantly, determinedly inflating their chests … Finally seeing, far away in the distance,
swaying proud ... soaked in the blue of space ...receiving from the sun its golden
streams ... the emblem of that almost invisible dot on the map ... which has been growing,
growing, growing.”8

After the 1924 and 1928 victories, the government offered to host and fully fund the first
FIFA World Cup in 1930 in order to celebrate the centennial of the signing of the
constitution and connect the growing national sentiment around soccer to the country’s
political history.9
The soccer victories of the first three decades of the 1900s “played an important
role in fostering a more unified nationalism” by “help(ing) integrate new populations and
provid(ing) the nation with a national - as opposed to political - rallying point.”10 The
pride generated by success transformed the national team into a common cultural symbol
for Uruguayans. Andrés Morales wrote that when the national team won the 1930 World
Cup, one was not “from Montevideo, nor the interior, nor creole, nor ‘gringo’ (name
given to the immigrants by the locals), nor black nor white, nor poor nor rich. One was
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‘Uruguayan’.”11 As soccer united the nation, it became a central component of
Uruguayan national identity; the “tournaments became gestures that overshadowed the
nineteenth century battles: the captains resembled the caudillos of the Independence
movement, the history of Uruguayan soccer began to be told from generation to
generation, and its victories and losses sung about during Carnaval.”12 The country that
had lacked historical figures and events around which to unite and identify, began to look
to players and improbable victories to fill those voids.
The epic win in the 1950 World Cup against Brazil cemented the players’ place in
the national imagination. In the country’s collective memory, the players’ victory was
demonstrative of the national character of perseverance. It was taken to confirm one of
the most prevalent myths on which Uruguayan nationalism was constructed: “the
incommensurability between size and achievement; the disproportionality between the
smallness of origin and the grandness of destiny.”13 After the first Brazilian goal in the
1950 World Cup, the Uruguayan captain, Obdulio Varela, approached the English referee
to complain about the offside goal. This action, which is said to have stalled the Brazilian
momentum and allowed the Uruguayans to compose themselves, was seen as a
personification of a “modern Uruguayan” that was valorous, determined, and capable of
overcoming any situation.14 Uruguayans saw Obdulio Varela as a mirror of Uruguayan
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society and his success as proof of what Uruguay could accomplish. Given the large role
of these individuals in Uruguayan history,
“it is paradoxical, that in all of the Montevideo city center, there is not one street, not one
square that memorializes the champion’s names, triumphs, or grand achievements. There
is one modest monument…a monument that Montevideans are not familiar with…on the
outskirts of the Estadio Centenario, in the middle of the park, on a small plot of land
called Maracaná Square.”15

Varela and the rest of the players of the early twentieth century were not celebrity figures
memorialized with grandiose monuments, but simple representatives of the Uruguayan
society who proved the country’s identity as a small, but formidable nation.

The Decline of the National Team
After the mid-1950s, the national team faltered. In the 1954 World Cup, Uruguay
lost to Hungary in the semifinals, a game that is to this day recognized as one of the
greatest soccer matches in the sport’s history. The years following the Hungary loss saw
the beginning of Uruguay’s decline.16 Between 1954 and 2000, Uruguay qualified to only
six out of the eleven World Cups and won just five of its twenty-four games.17 Rafael
Bayce, a Uruguayan sociologist, claims that the national team’s decline was “hastened by
the twin processes of unrealistic public expectations and hostility towards its football.”18
The country’s shared sense of nationhood was grounded in stories of glory and triumph,
so Uruguayans refused to celebrate anything but victory. Uruguay’s fourth place finish in
1970, its best result in twenty years, was a disappointment to Uruguayan fans who had
expected a third World Cup title. Twenty years later, Gallup included a question in one of
15
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their polls that asked individuals in which place they thought each of the sixteen
participants of the 1990 World Cup would finish. From those poll results, Bayce
calculated the “unreality coefficient”, a comparison between the place that each country
ranked itself and the placement of that same country in the final, overall poll results.
Every country saw itself performing better than other countries expected it to, thus all had
an unrealistic coefficient larger than one. Uruguay had the single highest “unreality
coefficient” of the entire poll at forty-nine.19 Even after decades of failing to qualify for
the tournament or getting eliminated early on, Uruguayans had not adjusted their
expectations. For Uruguayans, it was the soccer success experienced in the glory days
that had become part of their national identity, and they were not ready to accept any less.
With the weight of the glorious past and the pressure to live up to the
idiosyncratic Uruguayan style, players “resorted to a nervous, physical style of play” by
the end of the 1950s.20 Giulianotti describes Uruguay’s adoption of the violent tactics as a
change to “a safer, more aggressive and physical style that reflect(ed) the media and
public thinking on football as war by proxy.”21 National team players adopted violence in
the name of garra charrúa, the defining Uruguayan characteristic seen in Obdulio
Varela’s courage and grit during the 1950 World Cup. Uruguay may not have had the best
or fastest individual players, but it gave the most effort, had the most guts, and played
with the most garra. The country’s “regressive nostalgia” for the glory days and teams of
the past impeded “the exploration of new tactics and playing styles”, leaving the team to
19
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perform with effort, aggression, and little else.22 More so, the national team’s new “style”
earned the country a horrific reputation, one that was confirmed in the 1986 World Cup
when Uruguay had a player sent off forty seconds into the game, the fastest red card
awarded to this day.23 The national team, once central to the Uruguayan identity due to
earning the country a positive external identity, developed a negative reputation.
The national clubs’ performances in two international competitions, the Copa
Libertadores and Intercontinental Cup founded in 1959 and 1960, respectively, offered an
opportunity to continue the narrative of Uruguay as a powerful soccer nation.24 Peñarol
and Nacional, the two main Uruguayan clubs, made it to the finals of one of the two
tournaments ten times between 1960 and 1971 and five times in the 1980s, winning the
competitions fifty percent of the time they reached the finals.25 The success of the clubs
allowed the ties between Uruguayan national identity and soccer to remain strong. Even
though the national team was not performing well, the country was still producing
internationally successful club teams; they were still a soccer nation. This would only
change in the 1990s, when the global commercialization of soccer led to the decline of
the Uruguayan clubs, as well: they lost stadium attendance, quality, players, and
international prestige.26 However, they did not lose their centrality in Uruguayans’ lives.
Fans could still associate with a national champion.
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The back and forth competition and success of the two main club teams sparked
emotions and excitement in Uruguay and caused club loyalty to displace the unity once
created by the national squad. Uruguayans still closely followed the national team and
had high expectations, but fans mostly cheered and supported their own club’s players
rather than the national squad as a whole. The antipathy between the opposing clubs’
fanbases was so large, that authorities had to physically separate the two crowds during
some national team matches.27 In 1986, Uruguay’s friendlies against Nacional and then
Peñarol were “… a sad display during which the Nacional fans cheered for Nacional and
the Peñarol fans cheered for Peñarol…”28 More than two decades later, the Peñarol
portion of the Uruguayan crowd whistled the substitution of Luis Suárez, a Nacional
player, for Diego Forlán, who had once been a Peñarol man. Suárez expressed his
frustration after the game, “I do not understand it, this is the Uruguayan jersey, we are all
here for the same reason… the club jerseys should be left aside.”29 Two months later,
when Nacional’s Sebastian Abreu and Peñarol’s Carlos Bueno were fighting for a starting
spot on the national side. Bueno asked the public to “stop saying Abreu or Bueno,
because one is identified with one part of the country and the other with another… we
cannot lose sight that we need to support Uruguay.”30 The national team no longer
overcame the country’s divides as it had during the glory days; it was seen as a collection
of club players rather than a unified representation of the country.
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The fans did not have as much patience with the national team as they did with
their club teams. In 2008, Coach Tabárez explained:
“I have previously stated that the national team does not have fans and that you can see
that when if within ten minutes we do not score, there is silence and then something else.
A fan of a club has a greater tolerance for suffering. It is clear in the case of Peñarol, the
fans supported even when things were not going so well, something that with the national
team does not occur.”31

Uruguay’s coach from 1999-2001, Daniel Passarella, had to request to stop playing in
Montevideo due to the insulting whistling he would get from the crowds.32 In 2004,
Alvaro Recoba, a player with a successful club career abroad who had been unable to hit
his stride for the national team, was whistled off the field in Montevideo by forty
thousand people due to a poor performance.33 Jorge Fossati, the national team coach
expanded on this: “in recent times, it gets to the point that the player himself prefers to
play away.”34 Four years later, one journalist wrote, “It is very rare that Uruguay gets to
play at home. But the times that it does, it plays against its rival and against the
people…”35 Uruguayans’ frustrations with the national squad due to decades’ long losing
streaks caused even home games to be a hostile environment for the players.

Locals and Repatriados: The Player-Fan Relationship
Due to commercialization and the player exodus to Europe, the national team
began to be comprised of both local players and repatriados, players under contract with
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clubs abroad. The repatriados played abroad because they were the best, which made
fans question why their inclusion in the national team did not yield better results for the
national team. The media and the public began to distrust the returning players and the
term repatriados developed a negative connotation. Fans, unable to comprehend why
players performed well abroad, but not at home, blamed the passion and dedication of
individual players. This caused the relationship between the national team and the
Uruguayan fans to flag.
The suspicion and distrust of the repatriados reached a climax in the 1990s, when
Luis Cubilla, the national team coach between 1990 and 1993, openly criticized the
italianos, the repatriados playing in the Italian league, when expressing his interest in
taking over the national squad:
“I cannot call a player that changes his mentality, that thinks that he wins $20,000 a
month, that he has the best clothes, that he has the best car and comes to pretend like he is
fair with his teammates. He hurts them when he says no, if they don’t pay $1,000, then
we will not play with La Celeste because in soccer you earn a lot of money and you have
to exploit it, and the player must earn money…”36

His comments clearly show the negative perception and questioning of repatriados in
Uruguay. As a response to his statement, the italianos announced that they would not
defend the sky-blue shirt until the coach retracted his statement.37 The media spun this as
further proof of the players’ arrogance and their abandonment of the Uruguayan fans and
said things like “the players… said no to the people.”38 The media’s criticism continued
even when the players accepted to return to the national team for the 1994 World Cup
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qualifiers. Journalists avoided in-depth analysis and blamed the team’s failure to qualify
for the World Cup on the italianos’ delayed arrival and lack of Uruguayan identity:
“…the Brazilians, who when they succeed keep doing samba, keep wearing flip flops,
and keep going to the bakery in Copacabana to drink beer with the guys from their
neighborhood. Never would they park a sport car at the door, because they know that that
is a clash with our way of life… those that let go of the national identity…they were
italianos”39

These events exposed the tension present between the Uruguayan public and players
abroad as Uruguayans felt abandoned by the players and failed to identify with them.
This marked the beginning of two decades of tension between fans and players.
As European soccer became richer, the exodus of Uruguayan players accelerated.
Between 1997 and 2001, 502 Uruguayan players left the country, the equivalent of more
than forty-five starting line ups.40 On August 2, 2007, Jorge Señorans, a Uruguayan
journalist, addressed the exodus:
“Many times, it is proposed that perhaps it would be best to create a base for the national
team with local players and just reinforce it with the ones from abroad. But the issue is
that there is not a professional group of local players, because if they perform well and
have a good enough level to be on the national team then they sleep with their suitcases
packed.”41

Señorans highlighted the thirteen national team players that had emigrated in the previous
year and emphasized how the exodus changed the composition of the national team. By
the end of the qualifiers for the 2010 World Cup, the Uruguayan team fielded only
players that had contracts with clubs abroad.42 The increase in the number of players
from abroad meant that the distrust that had existed between the fans and the italianos
during the repatriados crisis of the 1990s now affected a large part of the national side.
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Fans wanted players to perform as they did with their clubs abroad, but did not want the
players to become dependent on the comforts that had become part of modern sports.
Giulianotti explains that “supporters criticized their (repatriados) efforts as corrupted by
the lazy, rich, unpatriotic, lifestyle that (was) allegedly enjoyed in foreign climates.”43 In
1994, Julio Toyos, a Uruguayan journalist, had expressed that very concern — that
players were becoming too dependent on the work conditions that they had abroad:
“And today, we must admit it, unfortunately, that they are good players, but they are
missing that something needed to carry the team on their back… that which Gambeta
had, that Obdulio had… the old Uruguayan soccer lineage. These guys have changed
their habits because they changed their environment. It is different when one changes in
the dressing rooms in Central and Sudamerica than when one begins to frequent the frilly
dressing rooms with air conditioning and hair dryers…”44

Unfortunately for the players, global commercialization had made fans perceive players
more as part of the “them” of the outside world rather than as representatives of the
Uruguayan “us”.
The Uruguayan Football Association, the national governing body of soccer, was
able to hide its own flaws by joining the fans in the criticism of the players. The national
association’s lack of reliable revenue streams due to a small domestic audience and a
declining club league inhibited it from providing good training and traveling conditions
to the players. While many of the national team’s failures could have been due to the
Uruguayan national team’s lack of modern facilities, the Uruguayan Football Association
passed the blame on to the players. In 2002, the executives announced that they wanted
to find players with a different kind of mentality for the national team, because they were
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displeased with the existing poor attitudes of the players on and off the field.45 The media
fanned the flames further. Journalists shared stories and poor experiences with the players
whom they said had never had the “decency to say good afternoon” and reported that
fans’ overwhelmingly agreed about the lack of humility, respect, professionalism,
modesty, and dignity found in their ‘superstar’ national players.46 They published quotes
about the Uruguayans’ frustrations over players’ lack of national characteristics, such as
the following: “to wear la celeste (sky-blue shirt) you must first be celeste” and “even if
the players are all coming from abroad, when one returns to this country, one drinks mate
(the traditional Uruguayan tea).”47 Both statements suggested that in order to play on the
national team, players needed to both play and behave the Uruguayan way. The media’s
negative narrative towards the players was still present in 2004 when journalists in
Uruguay referred to the players returning from abroad with phrases like “big names that
blind us”, “lacking good attitude”, “prefer to lose without the famous ones”, and “in need
of more dignity”.48 Players did not take the attacks well and often expressed their
frustrations with the media, hoping that they would stop accusing them of not giving their
all.49
During the early glory days, the team had been made up of working men, normal
Uruguayans. While at the end of the century, the local clubs still consisted of this type of
players, at least before they left to go abroad, the repatriados were seen as spoiled
45
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celebrities with bad attitudes.50 Giulianotti describes the shift using the example of Enzo
Francescoli who “reflect(ed) the bourgeoisification within South American football. His
nomadic pursuit of wealth and success (was) the antithesis of Varela’s satisfaction with
more frugal civic rewards for more definitive and glorious deeds.”51 The repatriados’
alleged greed was contrasted with the ‘hunger’ experienced by the figures of the past and
those still struggling with the poor salaries of Uruguayan clubs.52 The lyrics of Orsei, a
song written by the Uruguayan band Rumbo, exposes the tension that grew between fans
and players by telling “the story of a garbage worker who stops himself acclaiming a goal
by his football hero after reflecting on the huge salary differences between them.”53
Commercialization turned the Uruguayan national players from everyday heroes to
wealthy celebrities, impeding Uruguayans from being able to identify with them and
challenging the historic connection between the national team and Uruguayans.
Uruguayans saw themselves as a soccer nation, because the sport was both the
cultural symbol that united the country internally and the one that provided them with an
identity abroad. The 1950 World Cup victory was the last major success of the
Uruguayan national soccer team, but the decline of the team’s caliber did not eradicate
the role of soccer in the national identity. As the national team lost international
prominence, national clubs filled the void. This allowed Uruguay to retain its identity as a
soccer country, but rather than uniting the country as the national team had, the clubs
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created opposing sub-communities within it. The national team no longer contributed
images and stories to foster the Uruguayan people’s shared sense of nationhood; instead,
club experiences served to divide the country. The club based division persisted even as
commercialization in the 1990s brought about the clubs’ economic decline and resulting
lack of competitiveness, because, unlike with the national team, fans were able to keep
identifying with the local club teams’ players. Whereas fans had once been able to
identify with the simplicity and humbleness of all national team players, see themselves
reflected in their heroes, and feel represented by the team, global commercialization’s
effects led fans to only be able to identify with those that were in the local leagues.
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Chapter Three: El Maestro Tabárez’s Long Term Project

Since the 1990s, the game of soccer has undergone major changes in terms of its
tactical orientation and infrastructural modernization. However, the Uruguayan national
team has struggled to keep up with these fundamental shifts. In its attempt to return the
national squad to old glory, the Uruguayan Football Association hired and fired twelve
coaches between 1990 and 2006, never allowing any of them to complete an entire World
Cup Qualifying cycle.1 When Óscar Wáshington Tabárez became coach in 2006, he
implemented a long-term plan to return Uruguay to a competitive level and adapt to the
changes of commercialization. Rather than trying to revive the glory days, Tabárez aimed
to reclaim Uruguay’s relevance in the globalized game by fixing the structural and
institutional flaws of the national game and giving it a new domestic and international
image.

The Troubles of Uruguayan Soccer
One indication of Uruguay’s institutional failures was the team’s struggle to find
opponents for friendly matches.2 The national association could not pay other teams to
travel to Montevideo and did not have the FIFA rankings or results in international
1“Los
2
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tournaments to be invited for friendlies elsewhere. Rather than test its squad against good
opponents, Uruguay often ended up playing against amateur Uruguayan squads, which in
turn led to even lower FIFA rankings.3 During the 2006 World Cup Qualifiers, the team
went an entire year without playing any friendlies.4 This made it difficult to develop
teamwork and game strategies with players under contract abroad. Moreover, European
clubs regularly refused to release their players or did so late for official national team
games, causing Uruguayan coaches to have to reshuffle the team and have only one or
two practices to train with the entire squad.5 A lack of cohesiveness on the field was the
result. It also affected the camaraderie of the team off the field; fights between coaches
and players were not uncommon. Both on and off the field, the team acted as a group of
individuals rather than a unit, fueling the portrayal of players as arrogant, selfish stars
playing for themselves rather than the country or each other.
For players used to the organizational standards of European clubs, the
Uruguayan national team could not offer adequate conditions. To improve its standing,
the team depended on these star players, but it did not offer them the facilities and
support they needed to be successful. The players complained, for example, that the
team’s training complex had never fully been completed when it was constructed and that
they had to sleep on old mattresses.6 The conditions for away matches were not better;
the Uruguayan Football Association often bought economy class flights for players,
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meaning that prior to playing a professional soccer match players had to spend an
uncomfortable overnight flight with their “knees up by their chest”.7 These poor
accommodations likely contributed to the disparity between players’ performances for
their clubs vs. for their country.

Óscar Wáshington Tabárez’s Diagnosis
After Uruguay failed to qualify for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, the
Uruguayan Football Association contacted Óscar Wáshington Tabárez to conduct a study
on the state of soccer in Uruguay. Tabárez, sometimes referred to as El Maestro, had had
a long coaching career in Uruguay, but he had also coached abroad which gave him the
outside perspective to analyze the flaws of the national game and understand the forces of
the transnational labor market. He had begun his coaching career with the youth divisions
of a small Uruguayan club, Bella Vista, while working at an elementary school in order to
make ends meet. With limited time, resources, and available players, Tabárez led
Uruguay to its first Pan-American Games’ gold medal in 1983. Four years later, he led
Peñarol to the Copa Libertadores title which put him in the spotlight and earned him the
appointment as the Uruguayan national team coach for the 1990 World Cup.8 Fired after a
Round of 16 elimination at the World Cup, Tabárez coached club soccer first in Boca
Juniors in Argentina and then first division clubs in Italy and Spain, where he had a
chance to observe the advances of the global game.
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Tabárez has been a close observer of Uruguayan soccer for a long time, and he
knew how it compared to the game in leading nations abroad. Already after his first stint
as Uruguayan coach in 1990, Tabárez had presented an analysis at a seminar on the
disparity between Uruguayan and global soccer.9 In 2004, at a time of “constant sporting
and organizational crisis…”, Tabárez identified the issues plaguing the national sport and
called for a leader to look past the immediate results, prioritize, and set realistic goals.10 A
year later, he gave a formal presentation at Uruguay’s Museum of Soccer in Montevideo
on the topic. In his speech, he stated that the movement of players to Europe was
interrupting players’ development and that changes needed to be made so that players
would be more prepared prior to leaving. He emphasized that to truly prepare players,
training needed to include human and professional aspects and not only technical ones
from an early age.11 Tabárez wanted to emulate the work that José Pékerman had done
with Argentina’s youth divisions to provide continuity, cohesion, and identity to the
national team process.12 Tabárez also called for changes from the Uruguayan Football
Association, explaining that to keep up with elite football, Uruguay needed to improve
velocity and therefore needed better-maintained fields for players to train on and more
modern training facilities.13 Uruguay, he argued, needed to rethink its approach to the
game, reign in unrealistic expectations before matches, and cut back on excessive
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criticism after games. Tabárez concluded his presentation by explaining that if Uruguay
followed his advice and modernized its training methods, the national team would once
again see positive results.14
Tabárez was nominated for the national team coach position in 2002 and 2004 by
Daniel Pastorini, a member of the Executive Board of the Uruguayan Football
Association, but failed to garner enough votes.15 In 2005, the Executive Board of the
Uruguayan Football Association finally offered him the position because it recognized the
potential of his long-term plan for the national team.16 Figueredo announced that
Uruguay would “need to begin to reformulate everything: the youth divisions, local
players, the experience with the players abroad. There (would) need to be a study and a
complete five-year plan.”17 Pastorini explained that “the most important thing is that the
project is for all of the national teams, starting from the very bottom with the youth
teams, from the base, and reaching the national side. It is important to begin a long-term
project.”18 Tabárez returned to the position as national team coach because the
Association accepted a different project; he would have declined to be hired under the
same conditions as in 1990.19
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Playing the Long Game: El Maestro’s Project
At his first press conference as coach, Tabárez distributed a folder to the media
with the label, “The Institutionalization of the Processes of the National Teams and the
Formation of their Players.”20 It was his proposal to modernize Uruguayan soccer and
respond to the effects of global commercialization. It offered a diagnosis of the state of
Uruguayan soccer, clear, concise goals for the project, and player development objectives
based on José Pekerman’s work with Argentina’s youth divisions and Barcelona’s recipe
for success in Europe. Tabárez attributed the poor state of the national sport to the exodus
of players, often at a very young age, and the discontinuity of organization and strategic
coordination of the national team.21 He proposed to establish continuity and stability in
Uruguayan soccer by instituting standardized policies and practice routines for all levels
of the national team, organizing all practices and games in advance to fit both national
and international calendars, and guaranteeing friendlies and competition for the national
side. Tabárez became the first Uruguayan coach to utilize computer software to analyze
opponents and past games, have the main team’s coaches also oversee the youth
divisions, and employ a psychologist to attend to the players.22 Although these practices
were common in successful European clubs and national teams, they faced heavy
criticism from conservative Uruguayan journalists until Tabárez backed them up with
results.
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Tabárez’s proposal outlined a tactical orientation, practice outlines, and numerous
other technical improvements, but it also concentrated on the pursuit of structural
changes in the Uruguayan Football Association, primarily in the way the youth divisions
were run. He had observed Pekerman’s work with the Argentina youth and wanted to
apply the approach in Uruguay. Tabárez sought to “coordinate the objectives and
activities of the national teams at all age groups to reach long and mid range
objectives.”23 Thus, Tabárez and his staff would oversee the work of the junior squads to
guarantee continuity.24 The proposal also stated that the coaching staff would “pay
attention to the intellectual development and the players’ connections with the cultural
universe (through their curriculum and other activities that positively influence their
personal, and eventually, professional, development).”25 Youth players would be
encouraged to continue their education and efforts were put into place to assist players’
who lacked it.26 For him, the youth needed to be able to learn more from soccer than
technical skills; he sought to teach them about social networking, communication, and
teamwork, as well.27
Tabárez maintained that the Uruguayan coaches needed to find a way to instill a
passion for the national team in the youth players before they left the country. He
maintained that “no team, no matter how deep its wallet, can have the luxury to be
missing organized youth divisions that identify with where they are, with the
23Ibid.,
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institution.”28 Thus, Tabárez designated time for his young players to learn and discuss
the history of country’s team, the importance of the national soccer culture, and the
privilege that it was to play on the team.29 He added that “reading, learning about
Maracaná, about the generation from the Olympics, is part of the player’s formation or
training…they need to feel a part of a historical continuum…of an identity that makes us
known abroad.”30 He sought to ensure that even after moving abroad, players identified
with the team, its history, its culture, and in turn, with the country. His reforms would
ensure that players understand the privilege of playing on the national team, willingly
return to play for the country in spite of the inferior conditions, and give it their all “for
the sky-blue jersey”. Tabárez aimed to embed Uruguayan traditions into the players, so
that even if they left Uruguay at a young age they would have an attachment to the
national team and the country; he prepared the players to be transmigrants.
To tackle the issue of excessive stardom and individualism that had hampered
team cohesion, Tabárez defined an ideal profile for players on the national team. Diego
Aguirre, a seasoned Uruguayan club soccer coach, described Tabárez’s emphasis on the
character of players: “for him it is more of the human aspect, the profile of player that
one needs to find…he maintains that the most important thing is the wood…that
afterwards one can carve it.”31 The players would need to demonstrate solidarity, effort,
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respect, and sacrifice and accept their respective roles on the team.32 To him, part of
solidarity and respect was having low profiles and being humble, and allowing “the only
star (to be) the team”.33 It was also about the right image to project to the rest of the
world. Tabárez aimed to counter the Uruguayan reputation of aggression and dirty play
by encouraging a different kind of garra from his players: they were to play cleanly and
strive for the Fair Play trophy.34 Concentrating on low profile players willing to play
within the rules of the game was Tabárez’s approach to saving Uruguayan soccer.

On the Field Results under El Maestro’s Project
In an interview in March 2016, the 2010 team captain, Diego Lugano, was asked
what had allowed for Uruguay’s return to success on the global stage. He replied:
“When the world credits our generation for this comeback, I am always very analytical. I
always point to the project, one that for the first time in Uruguayan history, was
concentrated on more than the result…We lost, we played poorly, and we still received
support… We had a historical privilege. We were not even close to being the best
generation of Uruguayan soccer players; we were just lucky to have the support of a type
of project that is now fundamental in modern soccer.”35

When the FIFA soccer ranking began in 1993, the Uruguayan team’s annual ranking was
seventeenth place. After a sharp decline in the late 1990s, Uruguay returned to around the
same level at which it had begun and stayed there until 2010. Since then, Uruguay has
managed to stay in or near the top ten. The graph below shows the team’s recent return to
the global stage, but also why the long-term process was crucial. The commitment to a
32
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long-term program yielded results: the Uruguayan national team is is again
internationally competitive.

Uruguay left South Africa in July 2010 with its best World Cup performance since
1970: fourth place. Diego Forlán became the first Uruguayan since 1970 to be placed on
the World Cup All-Star team and the first one in history to be selected as the best player
of the tournament.36 The tournament legitimized the Tabárez process with the successful
introduction of several youth division players that had played in the 2007 U-20 World
Cup, such as Luis Suárez, Edinson Cavani, and Martín Cáceres, and one from the 2009
U-20 World Cup, Nicolas Lodeiro.37 The seamless transition from the youth divisions and
the main squad worked.
The success continued after the 2010 World Cup. The following year, Uruguay
won its fifteenth Copa América, becoming the country with the most Copa América
championships in history. The first place finish, like the fourth place in the World Cup,
36
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provided financial relief for the Uruguayan Football Association through prize money; it
also assured improved friendly schedules for the following years.38 At the Copa América,
Uruguay won the Fair Play Award for the most sportsmanlike and clean team in the
tournament. National team player Sebastian Abreu joked after the tournament that giving
the Fair Play Award to Diego Lugano, the team captain always seen as an aggressive
defender, was like giving the Nobel Peace Prize to bin Laden.39 Luis Suárez was awarded
Best Player of the Tournament, while Sebastián Coates was given the award of Best
Young Player of the Tournament.40 Both Suárez and Coates had come out of U-20
squads, illustrating how the long-term project led directly to player development and
success.
By mid-2012, Uruguay was second behind only Spain in the FIFA Ranking, its
highest placement since the ranking system began in 1992, and it participated in the
Olympic soccer tournament for the first time since its 1928 Gold Medal.41 In 2013,
Uruguay qualified for its third U-17 World Cup, while the U-20 squad became the first in
the world to qualify to four consecutive U-20 World Cups.42 At the 2013 U-20 World
Cup, many of the players that had contributed to the second place finish in the 2011 U-17
World Cup in Mexico led Uruguay to the second place spot behind France.43 The young
Uruguayan players cultivated teamwork on the field and camaraderie off it before even

38

“El Campeón de la Copa América se llevará 6,5 millones de dólares,” FutbolRed, 2015.
Jonathan Wilson, “Uruguay under Óscar Washington Tabárez can claw way to World Cup,” The Guardian, October
13, 2013.
40 “Suárez y Coates lo mejor de la Copa,” Referi, July 24, 2011.
41 “Londres 2012: Uruguay vuelve al fútbol olímpico luego de 84 años,” El Comercio, July 18, 2012.
42 Piñeyrua, 15.
43 “El semillero de Tabárez,” El País, June 22, 2014.
39

51

joining the main national squad. Just two months after the U-20 second place finish, one
of the starting defenders, José María Giménez, debuted with the national team at a “win
or be eliminated” World Cup Qualifier. After falling out of the top four, the only direct
qualifying slots in the South American Qualifiers, Uruguay had had its back against the
wall. In order to keep its World Cup dreams alive, it had to beat Colombia. Giménez
helped shut out Colombia in a 2-0 win and allowed Uruguay to continue its path to the
2014 World Cup.44 In November 2013, Uruguay qualified, yet again, through an
intercontinental playoff due to finishing fifth in the South American Qualifiers; this
marked the first time since 1990 that Uruguay attended two World Cup tournaments back
to back. After captain Diego Lugano suffered a knee injury during the first game of the
2014 World Cup, Giménez, one of Tabárez’s youth players, ably replaced him in the
victories against England and Italy, Uruguay’s first wins against European opponents
since 1966.45 Under Tabárez, Uruguay has experienced its most successful period since
the early twentieth century. The success owes much to strong teamwork and a tactical
orientation that is taught all the way down the youth levels; young players are able to
quickly fill the voids left behind by aging players.
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Chapter 4: The Reinvention of La Celeste’s Image

Óscar Washington Tabárez recognized that the negative attitude towards players
was a result of soccer’s global commercialization, but also of the glorification of the past
and the comparison between “those authentic champions and the ones from now”.1 The
contemporary players’ affluence and celebrity status marked a stark difference from the
profiles of past players and the traditional Uruguayan self-perception. The players of the
glory era, such as José Nasazzi in 1930 and Obdulio Varela in 1950, contributed to the
formation of the identity of the “us”, the Uruguayan identity that is characterized by its
simple, humble, and down-to-earth nature. On the other hand, Uruguayans questioned
contemporary players who had moved abroad for their lack of Uruguayan characteristics;
they were not always seen as part of the “us”. Tabárez claimed that the best strategy to
address the veneration for past glories was to “combat…with effort, a certain image, and
results” and to “connect the past and present to build the future of the national team.”2
Tabárez’s plan looked to develop a player-team relationship like that of the past, but
within the limitations and context of the new globalized game.
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The New Profile: Discipline, Humility, and Solidarity
Tabárez, inspired by the image of Barcelona players, “their professionalism, good
manners, respect for their rivals and the public”,3 put an emphasis on highlighting the
human qualities. He sought to take advantage of the national team’s platform to
promulgate positive value systems, such as “setting challenges, overcoming them, having
goodwill… and respect, the solidarity that comes with everything that is done with a
group, and the feeling of belonging.”4 Tabárez insisted that “when one is a child, young,
one has the necessity to have idols, role models, and if we work towards having certain
types of role models, that relay certain values, show certain things, we will have good
teams.”5 The national team was to represent the country well internationally and the
players to act as role models for Uruguayans. Tabárez asked for a polished appearance,
so as to emulate the professionalism displayed in European club and national soccer.
Players were to wear suits and ties during travel in order to make the team look put
together and professional and emphasized the players’ appearances in press conferences.6
One of the main areas that Tabarez focused on was the players’ communication
skills. For years, journalists had portrayed players as rude and arrogant, and videos of
inarticulate press conferences had made them look uneducated. Tabárez recognized that
communication and speaking were among the professional players’ new responsibilities
in a media-driven soccer business and noted that “everyone laughs at the soccer players,
3
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but no one helps them.”7 Looking to prepare players while they were still in the youth
divisions, he implemented role-playing exercises during which individuals took turns
answering questions while the rest of the team gave feedback on their deliveries.8 His
efforts were recognized after the 2010 World Cup when the Uruguayan Academy of
Language, a public institution that strives to preserve, enrich, and promote the
development of the national language and culture in Uruguay, wrote Tabárez a letter
congratulating him for the players’ simple, respectful, and appropriate way of speaking.9
Tabárez also encouraged the national players to be humble and amicable towards
fans. “No one is better than anyone else” is a famous Uruguayan expression that
“Uruguayans have inscribed in their DNA…”10 Humility is a central pillar of Uruguayan
identity and thus, the Uruguayan public found it difficult to see famous, high-profile
players as mirrors of the Uruguayan society. Tabárez encouraged humility which made
players seem approachable, but also more Uruguayan; this encouraged the narrative that
players were able to retain their national identity even when spending the majority of
their time abroad. El Mundo, a Spanish newspaper, praised the Uruguayan players in a
2011 article that labeled Uruguay as the “team of the people”: they are “always with a
smile. Always signing autographs for fans when they leave the hotel. No one is denied.
With order and professionalism, Uruguay is the model for the rest of the teams to
imitate.”11 Team captain Lugano showed leadership in this area and set a goal for himself
7
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to never deny his autograph or picture.12 The fans were granted access to the players
while they were in Uruguay or at tournaments, which helped to counteract the remoteness
between fans and players that was caused by the global commercialization of the sport.
The team’s openness kept the players grounded, while showing appreciation, kindness,
and humility to the fans.
The players’ involvement with Uruguayan society did not end with autographs
and selfies. Tabárez’s 2010 World Cup team founded Fundación Celeste, a nonprofit
conceived by the players at the World Cup and founded with a portion of their World Cup
winnings. In addition, many players had individual projects to give back to society, such
as benefit games, traditional parties in their hometowns, and visits to hospitals.13 The
players also used their high profiles to call attention to serious issues. For example,
following a deadly tornado in Uruguay on April 15, 2016, the national team players sent
videos of encouragement and shared information on their social media page about
donation drives for those affected.14 Tabárez encouraged this openness of the squad to
the public, but the philanthropic actions, such as the nonprofit and the players’ individual
endeavors, were player-driven initiatives. The players wanted to use their privileged
position to have a long-term impact on their society.15 The players’ work for their local
communities helped change the narrative that had haunted the repatriados of the national
team for decades; it helped debunk the notion that moving abroad had severed their
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connection and passion for Uruguay. They showed that they had interests and relations
that spanned borders. They were transmigrants.
The “no one is better than anyone else” mentality and the emphasis on solidarity
translated into improvements of the team’s chemistry. Before Tabárez, individual star
players from different clubs had struggled to create a cohesive team.16 Tabárez managed
to create a group unlike previous Uruguayan teams, one in which each player accepted
his role and problems with stars and divas did not exist.17 The squad’s solidarity became
just as much of identity marker for the Uruguayan national team as garra charrúa had
been for decades.18 Luis Suárez, later to become Uruguay’s all-time top scorer, praised
the dynamics of the national team before he was a regular starter: “…no one thinks they
are better than anyone else… no, we are all the same and that makes the group feel good,
happy. The fact that all 23 players that are on the team know that they have the chance to
play. It unites the group.”19 In 2011, Sebastián Eguren, a midfielder on the 2010 Uruguay
team, stated, “I have never seen a group like this one, there is magic. The ‘us’ prevails
over the ‘I’”,20 a sentiment similar to the one shared by Diego Lugano in 2010 when he
credited the result achieved in South Africa to the unity and friendship that Tabárez had
encouraged.21 The team’s unity and the players’ humble attitude earned the respect and
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admiration of Uruguayans who saw the players as mirrors of society — and it prevented
conflicts within the team.

The Role of Technology During the Tabárez Era
The later years of the Tabárez era coincided with an increase in access to cable
television and the internet in Uruguay. In 2011, 52.4% of Uruguayans had cable or
satellite television subscription, while 33.5% of households had internet access. Those
numbers increased to 68% and 57.4%, respectively, by 2014.22 As cable and internet
access increased in Uruguay, European clubs began to gain more regular followers from
Uruguayan soccer fans. As affinity to national team players grew and access to the
international leagues increased, following the performances of Uruguayan players abroad
became a shared experience for Uruguayans; the game scores and player performances
became part of everyday conversations. It was the teams with successful Uruguayan
players, such as Liverpool, Barcelona, and Paris St. Germain, that gained the most fans.
For example, the French league only began to gain traction in Uruguay when Edinson
Cavani and Diego Rolan began playing there in 2013.23 The increased access to foreign
games was accompanied by increased media coverage. In 2013, the national newspapers
began to publish a weekly list of all of the Uruguayan players abroad, the date and time
of their games that week, and the channel on which they could be seen.24 Additionally,
local news channels began to show video compilations every day of Uruguayan goals
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around the world for those that could not watch the games. The increased access to
technology allowed Uruguayans to stay up to date with the games of Uruguayan players
abroad, watch their highlights, and feel involved in their successes and failures.
Television also allowed the team’s new image to be promulgated by an array of
marketing campaigns. The national team players endorsed a wide range of products,
everything from laundry detergent to snacks had a celeste special edition.25 By being
spokespeople for everyday Uruguayan products, the players encouraged the narrative that
they maintained a Uruguayan lifestyle. While the Uruguayan players benefitted from
aligning themselves with national brands and products, marketing firms profited from
using the national team as a vehicle to connect their products with the people.26 These
marketing firms tied their products to the players that were beloved by the public, but at
the same time legitimized the fact that the team’s lessons and values were just as
important as their results. Marketing campaigns incorporated themes like respect, family,
and self discipline into their commercials. Antel, a telecommunication company, made a
commercial with Diego Forlán in which he talked about giving it your all, pushing
yourself, and studying.27 UTE, an electricity company, had an ad with captain Diego
Lugano in which he stated that “together we can do more” and that “sometimes you lose,
sometimes you win, but what is important is knowing you tried your best.”28 The
marketing firms facilitated the dissemination of Tabárez’s’ new value-centered player
profiles and encouraged fans to place value in the effort and not the results.
25
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The Uruguayan Football Association’s own marketing firm, Punto Ogilvy,
actively promoted the importance of the team’s non-soccer successes. The firm explained
the special appeal of Tabárez’s group: “more than in sporting results, we Uruguayans see
the values of our society in this group of professional athletes, the ones that keep
showing us that through those values one gets results. Even more importantly, they
reaffirm our way of being, our culture, and our identity.”29 In 2014, Punto Ogilvy created
a marketing campaign for the Uruguayan Football Association that focused on these nonsoccer aspects. The campaign was named “Valores Celestes (Sky-Blue Values) —Made in
Uruguay”. The promo spot showed a montage of game clips while a dramatic narrator
said:
“The result always matters, but it is not everything. El Maestro already said it: The
journey is the reward. We can do spectacularly well, we can do fine, or we can even do
poorly, but for us Uruguayans the only possible result is to put our hearts into each thing
that we do. To complete each play with respect, teamwork, confidence, discipline,
courage, talent, and love. That is Uruguay. Those are our values. Let’s go La Celeste. You
can see who we are… on the field.”30

Punto Ogilvy and the Uruguayan Football Association took Tabárez’s focus on the
journey and used it to promote an identification with the team that depended on values
rather than results. This helped construct the narrative that what made the players
Uruguayan symbols was not triumphs or glory, but their Uruguayan values.
Social Media and the internet allowed the public to get to know its national team
players on a more personal, human level within the context of the new globalized world.
The intimacy of the relationship between players and fans that formed in the early
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twentieth century -- when they lived next to each other, saw each other on the street, and
shared a lifestyle -- was impossible in the new era of international transfer markets.
Social media and the internet, however, allowed for a new type of connection to exist,
similar to that between Uruguayans and family members outside of the country. The
technology could not offer the same immediate contact as living next to each other, but
they did permit shared experiences to continue long distance. By seeing the day to day
lives of the players, fans were able to feel connected. In 2010, Diego Forlán published
pictures and public updates, “because he once had been a fan and (knew) that having the
possibility to know what a player lived day by day (was) nice.”31 The internet and social
media both served to close the emotional gap between players and fans by allowing
Uruguayans stuck on the other side of the ocean to have a first hand account of events.
Television programs, such as Cámara Celeste and Pasión Mundial, began to
follow the teams to tournaments to show a more in-depth account of the players’ lives.
The shows highlighted arbitrary, non-soccer every-day moments throughout the players’
experience, which helped the narrative of the players’ normalcy. For example, during the
2010 World Cup, Cámara Celeste, a show filmed with a shaky handheld camera, showed
interviews with the players in the airport duty-free shop buying perfume and signing
autographs, the hotel pool drinking mate, and on the plane listening to music or
sleeping.32 The show, which was more like a home video, made the players appear like
normal Uruguayans, not distant celebrities. Sebastian Abreu, a forward on the national
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side, pursued a similar project when he recorded the team’s experience at major
tournaments to later share with the public; he wanted to allow the fans to see the
tournament from their point of view.33 In 2015, the show Por la Camiseta used informal
interviews to show the day to day lives of nine Uruguayan players in Europe and to “get
to know the person more and the player less.”34 The show did display the elite lifestyle of
the players, but it mostly concentrated on how each of the players maintained Uruguayan
traditions, whether it be food or music, in their everyday lives, and how each of them,
even though they were superstars, gave everything “for the (Uruguayan) jersey”.35 These
television shows put on display the lives of the national team players, highlighting
characteristics and values that demonstrated that the players were transmigrants,
representatives of the “us” even while living among the “them”.

A New Connection Between Players and Fans
In his first official meeting with the players in May 2006, Tabárez asked them for
adhesión. He asked them to take part in his project and ignore the hostile atmosphere in
Uruguay that had sparked controversies and early player retirements from the national
side in the past. During that first encounter, well aware that the public was at odds with
the national team, Tabárez appealed to the players and asked that they have faith in his
project. He said, “You guys know what they may say in Uruguay about you. That you
don’t try as hard on the national team as you do at your clubs, that you won’t give it your
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all, even that they think you come to steal money. You guys already know all of this. So I
ask that you never allow that to be a justification to stop doing things.”36 He asked his
players to buy into the project even in bad times, because he knew that the public would
not grant its support until it saw positive results. When referring to the fate of the project,
Tabárez pointed to “a film by Woody Allen, Match Point, that starts with a tennis ball
running along the net, while a voiceover says that the story he is going to tell will be one
if it falls to one side and another if it falls to the other.”37 Tabárez’s appeal to the team was
parallel to the opening scene; he claimed the success and the public opinion of the project
depended entirely on the results.
To Tabárez’s and the players’ surprise, however, the public valued and applauded
the changes made off the field even before the team produced positive results at the 2010
World Cup. On the eve of their departure to South Africa, over 2,000 fans went to the
Montevideo Airport to watch the team depart, a crowd that shocked the players and
executives. Edgard Welker, the Vice President of Peñarol at the time, reacted to the crowd
at the airport, “(the players) have a lot of ‘feeling’ with the people. Honestly, it is
unbelievable. When I got here, I could not believe it… all the people that are here.”38 The
Vice-President of the Uruguayan Football Association, Miguel Sejas offered his
explanation, “one sees the fervor of the Uruguayan public, the hope. I think that more
than the achievements on the field, it is the attitude of the team that has caused this
current relationship.” Diego Lugano, the captain of the Uruguayan squad, explained the
36
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crowd’s size by highlighting that “the Uruguayan people identify with the group and the
group identifies itself with the people.”39 The crowd’s size demonstrated that the
improvement in the team-fan relationship did not occur merely as a result of the 2010
tournament; the public supported the Tabárez process and the players even before the
team achieved positive results.
The fan support was particularly surprising in light of the negative media
portrayal. A compilation of videos collected by Channel 10 in Uruguay, called “Tabárez
vs. Journalism”, highlights the continual barrage of criticism that the coach and players
received prior to 2010. Julio Ríos, a Uruguayan sports commentator and journalist
complained in July 2007, “Tabárez manages the players as if this was European soccer.
Which is not the way to work with the player from the River Plate or a Uruguayan.” Two
years later, he was still at it: “this is a European team. I ask myself if Uruguayan soccer is
like that or if it is more of an undisciplined style.” Uruguayan soccer identity had been
tied to a violent interpretation of garra charrúa for decades, leading journalists to
criticize the overemphasis on respect, solidarity, and values as a move away from the
Uruguayan way. Alberto Sonsol complained in August 2008 that “they say ‘the group is
great’, ‘they’re all respectful’, ‘that they all get along’… but I want them to win. What do I
care if they get along or not?” In June 2009, he pushed that winning was all Uruguay
should aspire to: “Uruguay is a slave of its rich history…History obligates us.”40 Tabárez’s
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emphasis on the human aspects of the players was seen as too much of a shift away from
the traditional association of soccer with national glory.
The identification between the fans and players grew stronger throughout the
2010 World Cup. When Uruguay won its second group stage game against the hosts in
June, many young Uruguayans took to the streets to celebrate. When asked by journalists
if the celebrations were too premature, the people responded that they were not.41 This
showed the mentality change that the country was undergoing. Luis Ubiña, the captain of
the 1970 Uruguayan team, compared the happiness experienced in Uruguay during the
2010 World Cup to that from 1950, stating that even back then people had not been as
joyful as they were during the South African tournament.42 For Uruguayans, all teams
had always been compared to the 1950 squad, which is why in 1970, fourth place had
been seen as a failure. In 2010, however, that mindset changed and fourth place was
accepted and celebrated as a big accomplishment. A song written as a fundraiser for
Fundación Celeste after the tournament has the lyrics “today like yesterday, in 1950.” It
equates the fourth place finish of the 2010 World Cup to the glory days of the past.43 In
2010, a fourth place finish was seen as a victory and the players as heroes.44 Journalists
joined the choir once the World Cup results were in. Julio Ríos complimented Tabárez for
a serious project and having chosen such an admirable player profile. Sonsol, who had
been insisting that only the result mattered, named the solidarity of the group as Tabárez’s
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biggest virtue and stated that “as Tabárez said in one of his press conferences, one cannot
be so perverse as to just celebrate World Cup titles.”45
On the day after their return from South Africa, Tabárez and the team paraded
from the team’s training complex to the Legislative Palace on a bus that was decorated
with the slogan Orgullo Celeste. The thirty kilometer trip lasted five hours due to the sea
of people that engulfed the bus as it made its way through the Montevideo streets.46 Once
at the Legislative Palace, the President of Uruguay, José Mujica, greeted and welcomed
the team, before allowing the players to talk, sing, and tell jokes to the massive crowd
that had gathered in front of the stage. Tabárez closed the ceremony with a reminder that
the results only served to legitimize a process that had been underway for almost four
years. Before thanking the crowd, he stated that “success is not only the result, but the
difficulties one endures, the continuous efforts, the spirit to take on new challenges, and
the will to overcome them. The journey is the reward.”47 His closing statement was a
reminder to the Uruguayan people to not depend on the final score for happiness and a
source of identity as they had in the past, but to recognize and enjoy “effort above titles,
garra over wins, and soccer over victory laps.”48
After the fourth place finish in the 2010 World Cup and the 2011 Copa América
victory, Tabárez and the players were recognized for their success in transmitting positive
values to the public and for showing the Uruguayan people what those values, such as
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hard work, respect, solidarity, and discipline, could achieve.49 Tabárez was named
“Champion for Sport” by UNESCO “in recognition of his commitment to promote
education and sport programs for vulnerable children in Uruguay, his charitable activities
in the framework of the Tabárez Project, and his dedication to the ideals and aims of the
Organization.”50 The players’ Uruguayaness was no longer questioned— in fact, it was
celebrated. The players were recognized for “personifying the basic values of the
Uruguayan culture” after their performance at the 2010 World Cup and honored by the
Uruguayan Post Office after their 2011 Copa América victory for “being examples of the
values that make up the country.”51 They were praised for being good role models for the
rest of society, especially kids. In 2013, two years after their Copa América victory,
Selección de Valores y Actitudes: Para educar con ejemplo (National Team of Values and
Attitudes: To educate by example), an educational book about the values exemplified by
the Uruguayan squad was published and distributed for free to educational centers around
Uruguay. The book used the national team’s solidarity and teamwork to teach about
behavior.52 In sharp contrast with past players that had been portrayed as arrogant stars
and traitors, these players were admired and respected for their characters and value
systems.
Uruguayans had begun to identify with the Uruguayan players, the team, and the
coach, rather than the idea of a distant and successful past. As Ricardo Piñeyrua, a sports
49
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journalist, explained, they went “from feeling obliged to win to trying to win,” and
realized that “the result (was) no longer the only goal, and that the image and, more so,
the behavior also matter(ed).”53 Triumphs had always played a role in the national
identity, but thanks to the Tabárez process, losses, challenges, and controversies also
began to be seen as experiences that contributed to the national identity. For decades,
Uruguayans had failed to adjust their expectations to the new globalized soccer world,
leading to disappointment and disapproval of players. Tabárez’s emphasis on the nonsoccer aspects of players allowed the public to identify with the team rather than the idea
of glory, allowing a new reference point for Uruguayan soccer to emerge.
Uruguayans’ acceptance of the players as part of the “us” rather than the “them”,
as true mirrors of society, was showcased during the 2014 World Cup. On June 24, 2014,
Luis Suárez bit the Italian defender Giorgio Chellini in a first-round World Cup match.
Some Uruguayans claimed he had not bitten the player, some claimed he had, but that it
was not a huge deal, and others, albeit fewer, condemned it as a barbaric act. When FIFA
announced the penalty for the bite, the country rallied around the player.54 FIFA kicked
Suárez out of the tournament, banned him from the national team for almost two years,
and forbid him from entering any soccer field for four months. Even those that had
condemned the biting rushed to defend Suárez against what they viewed as a large
corporation making an example out of a player that lacked a powerful association to
defend him.55 For Uruguayans, Suárez vs. FIFA was David vs. Goliath. Daniel Renfrew,
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an anthropologist, explained that “defending Suárez turned into a national cause,
regardless of what people thought of his actions on the field that day…Suárez has
garra…and he is us.”56 For the Round of 16 match, a television company set up a screen
outside of Suárez’s home for the more than a thousand fans that were standing in
solidarity out in the cold. The fans held up a banner that read “3 million sky-blue hearts, 6
million arms to help you back up”, stickers that said “We are all Suárez”, and Suárez
masks that had been printed that day under a newspaper headline that read “we are all
one”. Even after the game ended in a loss, the crowds cheered “Let’s go Uruguay” and
“Olé, olé, olé, olé, Lucho! Lucho!”. 57 Uruguayans did not blame Suárez for the World
Cup elimination; they saw him, a millionaire soccer player, as a small, weak Uruguayan,
that was a victim of the powerful, outside world.
The Round of 16 elimination in the 2014 World Cup, which more than one
thousand Uruguayans watched outside of Suárez’s home, was the equivalent of the 1990
result that had led to the firing of Tabárez and the tension of the repatriados crisis. The
poor result could have undermined the Tabárez project and the relationship between
players and fans again, but instead, the Uruguayans’ reaction to the 2014 World Cup
elimination was one of support. More than 4,000 people went to the Montevideo airport
to welcome the players home from Brazil. In an article describing the warm reception,
the journalist Diego Pérez wrote:
“if one tells somewhere else in the world that four thousand Uruguayans welcomed the
team…after a Round of 16 elimination…few would understand it. But this group has
achieved that. There is an identification between the pueblo and this team, or even more
56
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so, with this process… If today there is such fervor for la Celeste, it is because these
players have, with their attitudes outside of the field, earned affinity and recognition that
goes further than winning or losing.”58

The reaction of the Uruguayans to the Suárez Case and the 2014 World Cup elimination
demonstrated that the relationship built between players and fans under Tabárez was no
longer entirely dependent on results. The fans identified with the team and players rather
than purely the glory. In the face of losses, they did not question the dedication and
passion of their players even in the face of an international controversy, but instead
identified with their effort and challenges.
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Conclusion
Soccer played a central role in Uruguay’s national identity throughout the 20th
century. The national team’s triumphs in the first half of the century were seen as proof
that the small nation could perform on a world stage. The mutually reinforcing
relationship between soccer success and national identity weakened after 1950 when the
national team stopped winning and when it entered into profound crisis in the 1990s as
Uruguayan star players began leaving the country to play in better leagues abroad. The
national team no longer provided the country with glory and the players were no longer
mirrors of Uruguayan society. Through his 2006 project, Tabárez tackled both of these
problems. First, he implemented institutional reforms to modernize Uruguayan soccer
and assure continuity and youth development. Second, by reinventing the image of the
national team, Tabárez created a new relationship between players and fans. He
reconstructed the relationship within the context of global commercialization by showing
that transnational players could still be national representatives and members of the
nation — the physical distance separating the players and the country did not diminish
their contribution to Uruguay’s national identity. Third, Tabárez emphasized that triumphs
were not the only stories that contributed to Uruguay’s shared sense of nationhood and
thus, that challenges and failures after valiant struggle could also contribute to the
country’s national identity. By deemphasizing physical space and triumphs as constitutive
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for the nation, Tabárez reshaped the relationship between soccer and national identity in
Uruguay.
Uruguay was one of the best teams in the world in the first half of the twentieth
century, winning two Olympic gold medals and two World Cups. The second half of the
century, however, saw the Uruguayan national team falter; the team lost its international
competitiveness and failed to even qualify for many of the World Cup tournaments.
Paradoxically, at the turn of the century, even after decades of poor results, Uruguayans
continued to base their expectations on the glories of the past rather than the reality of the
present; this was due to the fact the Uruguayan national identity was not connected to
soccer in general, but soccer success specifically. Instead of recognizing that the machine
itself was outdated, Uruguayans blamed the individual parts for the lack of effort. After
each disappointment, rather than looking for the root of the problem, such as the poor
infrastructure or the organizational chaos of the Uruguayan Football Association,
Uruguayans blamed the players who held contracts abroad. This friction between players
and fans was due to the disconnect created by the players’ transfers abroad — putting on
the sky-blue jersey was not enough to convince fans that the national team players were
passionate and dedicated Uruguayans. Uruguay’s national soccer association did not
adapt to the changes brought about by global commercialization of soccer until Tabárez
became head coach in 2006. Tabárez understood the roots of the Uruguayan national
team’s lack of success and initiated reforms on two fronts.
He initiated both tactical and technical changes to tackle the team’s systemic
problems and to make it competitive within the globalized, commercialized world of
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soccer. Before Tabárez, it was unclear whether a small country like Uruguay could
compete with larger, wealthier countries at all in the globalized and commercialized
context. Tabárez showed that with adaptations and careful, long-term planning it was
possible. Rather than pushing against it or ignoring it, Tabárez accepted the new reality
brought about by global commercialization and implemented standardized policies,
practice routines, and tactics to adapt to it. Tabárez also redesigned the Uruguayan youth
division to better fit the new reality. He connected all young players with potential to the
Uruguayan national team early on and then followed their development abroad to
determine which players would serve Uruguay best. He recognized that while Uruguayan
clubs could produce top players, they could not help them mature and become elite
soccer players due to a lack of resources. Tabárez showed that Uruguay could be
competitive in the globalized, commercialized game by adapting and taking advantage of
some of its aspects, such as the European clubs’ elite player development. His success
proved that Uruguay could adapt to and accept the new reality of soccer without
sacrificing the cohesiveness and Uruguayan nature of the national team.
Tabárez’s also worked to reconcile the national identity with the new globalized
reality of soccer by changing the team’s culture. Several of Tabárez’s reforms helped
reinvent the connection between the national team and Uruguayans in the new global
context, so that the team could still have a role in constructing Uruguay’s shared sense of
nationhood. The increase in focus on the youth divisions, television coverage of youth
games, and successful results of Uruguay’s U-15, U-17, and U-20 teams in international
tournaments allowed Uruguayans to associate the youth players with the sky-blue jersey
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from an early age. Fans began to see these players as potential members of the national
team before they even moved to Europe; this meant that Uruguayans could follow their
transfer abroad, watch them develop, and monitor their improvement all in hopes that
they would one day be good enough to join the national squad. Uruguayans followed the
actions of their players abroad with the national team in mind; this challenged the old
version of national identity that depended on proximity and space.
Through his reforms, which took advantage of modern technology, Tabárez
deemphasized the relationship between space and national identity by showing that the
players did not need to be in Uruguay to be Uruguayan. Essentially, Tabárez taught
Uruguayans to accept that players in the age of globalized soccer live as transmigrants.
Tabárez required the players to act and communicate in a Uruguayan way, but he also
took advantage of aspects of global commercialization itself. The media attention and
press conferences that had previously detrimentally affected the image of the players
were utilized to showcase players’ positive value systems and Uruguayan demeanor.
Similarly, the technology that had led to the decline of the country’s domestic club league
became a tool that benefitted the Uruguayan national team; the commercials,
sponsorships, social media, and television shows worked to show fans that even though
the players had left the country at a young age, they were still invested in Uruguayan
society. The fact that players’ training facilities, playing strategies, and standards of living
were becoming more European was less threatening since the players were mirrors of
Uruguayan society in attitude, behavior, and values. By constructing a new team image,
Tabárez tamed the critiques against the players and revitalized the relationship between
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the people and the team. He encouraged Uruguayans to see their players as part of the
Uruguayan collectivity rather than outsiders; Uruguayans began to see the members of La
Celeste like the Chileans saw their players, as transmigrants.
Tabárez also deemphasized the relationship between glory and national identity
by encouraging realistic expectations and the concept of “the journey is the reward”. In
the past, Uruguayans had identified with the early glory days; the shared experiences that
had created the dynamic between national identity and soccer had all been triumphs, so
that is what Uruguayans demanded from the national team. In the new globalized and
commercialized reality, the Uruguayan national team could not be expected to win the
World Cup every time. If the fans maintained their unrealistic, high expectations and only
identified the national team with glory, the reinvigorated relationship between fans and
players would be short lived. Tabárez recognized this and explicitly encouraged fans to
begin to identify with the team and their efforts instead of the results. The players were
embraced not because they were champions, but because they represented the Uruguayan
society each time they stepped onto the field, be it for nation or club. This cultivated a
fanbase that was more emotionally attached to the team than to the victories, thus
providing more leeway to the coaches and players to bring about positive results.
Tabárez’s reforms assured that Uruguayans saw players as transmigrants, not
“foreigners”, and that as a result, they identified with their challenges and efforts rather
than championships.
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The Current State and Future of the Uruguayan National Team
The question many fans and observers ask is whether the success that came with
the Tabárez reforms is there to last. At first glance, it certainly appears to be the case. In
its first match of the 2018 World Cup South American Qualifiers in October 2015,
Uruguay beat Bolivia in La Paz for the first time in history. The games that followed
included two victories, 3-0 wins against Colombia and Chile, and a narrow 2-1 loss to
Ecuador in Quito. These results were impressive, not least because the matches were
played without Luis Suárez, the country’s top all-time scorer, due to his ban from the
2014 World Cup. The team’s success without its big star supported Tabárez’s message
that “no one is more than anyone else”, as the Uruguayans like to say; the national team
is about the group, not individual stars. After Suárez’s return to the national team after a
two year absence, Uruguay tied Brazil 2-2 in Recife and beat Peru 1-0 in Montevideo. It
looks very likely that Uruguay will qualify for the 2018 World Cup, which would be the
first time since 1974 that Uruguay has qualified for three consecutive World Cups.
The future beyond the 2018 World Cup is less certain, however. Tabárez has
created a team that the Uruguayan people have become invested in; most Uruguayans
believe that this group is composed of true Uruguayans that passionately defend the skyblue jersey and represent the Uruguayan society. The fans trust this team and have stuck
by its side through good and bad moments. The relationship between the fans and the
team has not suffered as some standout players have left the national squad. Diego
Forlán, the Most Valuable Player from the 2010 World Cup, and Diego Lugano, the team
captain, were two of the faces of the successes in 2010 and 2011, but as they retired, the
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fans supported the new leaders: Luis Suárez and Edinson Cavani as the new team
forwards, José Maria Giménez as the new central defender, and Diego Godín as the new
captain. Importantly, all of the new players had something in common; they had come up
through Tabárez’s youth divisions and represented the type of player he wanted. The
central questions are: will that continue after the 2018 World Cup when Tabárez is 71, his
contract runs out, and he does not sign on for another four years? Will the Uruguayan
Football Association maintain his reforms? Will the players continue to fit his player
profile? Will the public continue to support them?
The Uruguayan Football Association will likely not maintain all of Tabárez’s
reforms after his exit unless the public demands it. During the ten years that Tabárez was
coach, there were five different Uruguayan Football Association presidents; Tabárez had
to convince each one to keep supporting the project. Each time that executives tried to cut
the budget for the youth divisions or attempted to push Tabárez out, they met public
uproar. This was due to the high popularity of the Tabárez process that was rooted in the
team’s success, but also in Tabárez’s personal integrity. Tabárez had the players’ adhesion
and the fans’ support before even the 2010 World Cup; it was the respect and trust that he
instilled in those two groups that pressured the Uruguayan Football Association to stand
behind him and his reforms each time that the budget was tight or results were not great.
After Tabárez’s exit, it will become clear whether the fans’ trust lies in the reforms
themselves or in the old, philosophical coach, El Maestro. If the fans have become
adherents of his process and they continue to pressure the Uruguayan Football
Association to prolong it, then the success of the Tabárez years may continue. However,
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if the fans belief is in Tabárez and “Tabárez’s players”, solely, and not in the “Tabárez
process”, then the “Tabárez era” will likely be followed by a decline of the Uruguayan
national team. The uncertainty over the future of the Uruguayan national team arises from
the realization that each aspect of the current national team revolves around, as is shown
by the translated sayings presented in the previous sentence, a man that will likely no
longer be the coach in two years.
The national association’s finances only add to the worry that it will be unwilling
to continue many of Tabárez’s reforms if fans do not demand that they continue once
Tabárez leaves. In January 2016, Mario Rebollo, Tabárez’s assistant, revealed that the
national team coaches had not been paid for four months or for any of their games in
2015, including friendlies, Copa América games, and World Cup Qualifiers.1 Two months
later, it was announced that the national association was still behind on the coaches’
salaries and that it did not have the money to pay, because it was two million dollars short
in its budget due the freezing of Full Play’s, the company that was to pay the national
association for the television rights for the World Cup Qualifiers, assets as a result of the
FIFA corruption scandal.2 Without Tabárez there to insist on the importance of long-term
investment, it is possible that money woes could lead to cuts in the low (short-term) profit
areas, such as the youth divisions, and decreased funding to high cost areas, such as
comfortable travel. Cuts like these would imperil the progress made by Tabárez’s
institutional reforms, but also the new dynamic between national identity and soccer. For

1“La AUF
2

nos debe 4 meses, es una falta de respeto,” República.com.uy, January 9, 2016.
“Se le debe a Tabárez, los clubes se endeudan, y la AUF no tiene plata,” Referi, March 15, 2016.
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example, if the youth are not taught the expected behavior and tactical orientation of La
Celeste or if players do not have comfortable working conditions, they may not perform
at the same level in Uruguay as they do abroad. This could once again lead to the
wrongful allegations of lack of passion and dedication to Uruguay and the breakdown of
the player-fan relationship. However, if the Uruguayan Football Association recognizes
the benefits of long-term investment and protects Tabárez’s reforms from future budget
cuts, then then the gains made under Tabárez will continue.
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